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O P I N I O N 
   
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 Carl Simon was convicted in 1994 for his part in a 
break-in that led to the death of Daniel Ezekiel. Twenty-five 
years later, we review his petition for habeas relief. Although 
we agree with the Appellate Division of the District Court for 
the Virgin Islands that most of Simon’s claims do not entitle 
him to relief, we remand for two reasons. First, the Superior 
Court abused its discretion when it declined to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing to address Simon’s claim that the Virgin 
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Islands Government violated its Brady obligations by failing to 
disclose a prior agreement with its key witness, James Roach. 
Second, the Appellate Division erred when it dismissed 
Simon’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective without 
first remanding to the Superior Court to conduct an evidentiary 
hearing. Simon presented facts that, if true, tend to show his 
counsel had a conflict of interest by representing one of 
Simon’s co-conspirators at the time of his trial. Thus, we will 
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the Appellate 
Division with instructions to remand to the Superior Court to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing on those two issues.  
 
I.1 
 
A. The Crime and Pre-trial Events. 
In September 1993, three men broke into the home of 
Elroy Connor. When Connor and Daniel Ezekiel returned in 
the midst of the break-in, a struggle ensued and Ezekiel was 
shot and killed. The three intruders fled the scene.  
 
Subsequently, James Roach was arrested for his 
involvement in the death of Ezekiel. Roach was charged in the 
District Court for the Virgin Islands with first degree murder 
under Virgin Islands law and unlawful flight to avoid 
prosecution under federal law.  As to the murder charge, he 
pled not guilty.  The murder trial was prosecuted by the Virgin 
                                              
1 The facts of Simon’s case have been thoroughly discussed in 
several opinions. See JA 30–40; Simon v. Gov’t of V.I., 679 
F.3d 109, 111–13 (3d Cir. 2012); Simon v. Gov’t of V.I., 47 V.I. 
3, 5–11  (2002). We thus set out here only what is necessary 
for the disposition of this appeal.  
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Islands Attorney General’s Office.  Roach testified on his own 
behalf, stating he was at his girlfriend’s house on the night in 
question, and thus did not commit the crime. When asked about 
a possible co-conspirator, Simon, Roach stated that he did not 
know him. In March 1994, Roach was found guilty of first 
degree murder and subsequently appealed his conviction and 
sentence to us. He later withdrew that appeal in March 1995. 
Roach was also convicted on the unlawful flight charge, but in 
October 1994 he moved to continue sentencing on that count.  
 
After Roach’s conviction, Simon was arrested. The 
Government filed an Information in the Superior Court of the 
Virgin Islands charging him with burglary, conspiracy, and 
first degree premeditated murder. The Court appointed 
Augustin Ayala, Esq., to represent Simon.  
 
Two weeks before trial, the Government notified Simon 
that it intended to amend the Information. One week before 
trial, it moved to amend the Information changing 
premeditated murder to felony-murder with a predicate felony 
of robbery. The amendment also added robbery and conspiracy 
to commit robbery. Ayala objected, as the amendment added 
new charges only a week before trial. The Court nonetheless 
granted the motion to amend the Information. Two days before 
trial, the Court again permitted an amendment to cure a defect 
over Ayala’s objection, removing the conspiracy count and 
altering some language to reflect the elements of felony-
murder.  
 
 
 
B. Trial and Direct Appeal 
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At trial, the Government presented Roach as its key 
witness. Shortly after his conviction, Roach provided a 
statement to officials that was diametrically opposed to his 
testimony at his own trial. In the statement, he indicated that 
Simon orchestrated the burglary and shot Ezekiel. Roach 
explained his change in tune, testifying, “I was scared. I was 
scared for my life. That’s why I didn’t tell the truth then, cause 
Carl Simon say he going to kill me. But, I ask for protection, 
and I get it, so I [am] willing to tell the truth now.” JA 444–45. 
Ayala cross examined Roach on, among other things, the 
“protection” he received. Ayala asked, “Do you know which 
Government gave the protection? Was it the Federal 
Government or the Local Government?” JA 482–83. He stated, 
“I can’t—the Local.” JA 483. On redirect examination, the 
Government asked Roach to explain what, if any promises, 
were made to him: 
 
[The Government]: Mr. Roach, will you state to 
the Court and the . . . Jury, whether or not the 
Government has made any promises to you for 
your testifying here today, in terms of reducing 
or having to do anything with your case? 
[Roach]: I ask for protection. 
[The Government]: And? 
[Roach]: So that Carl Simon and he brother [sic] 
and they couldn’t get to me.  
[The Court]: Are there any other promises that 
were made to you by the Government? 
[Roach]: No, Sir.  
 
JA 498. Although other witnesses testified at Simon’s trial, 
Roach was the only witness to affirmatively place Simon at 
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Connor’s house and identify him as the one who shot Ezekiel. 
Connor, the homeowner, testified that Roach was with a 
shorter man, but never identified the “short man” as Simon, nor 
did he identify him at trial. See JA 578–59 (“No, I couldn’t see 
[his face].”). In addition, Roach and Connor’s testimony 
conflicted: Roach indicated that Simon put a t-shirt over his 
head to cover his face, while Connor indicated the man wore a 
stocking.  
 
The third intruder was never formally identified. Ayala 
questioned Roach about a man named Daryl Ward, the possible 
third man. Roach stated that he had a conversation with Ward 
in jail and that he “fit the description” of the third man, but “it 
wasn’t him” because “he was in jail, and when I really think, it 
wasn’t him.” JA 465–66. Roach further stated that it “wasn’t 
him” because of “how he express[ed] [him]self.” JA 469. 
Ayala testified years later in an unrelated proceeding that:  
 
Ward, as far as I’m concerned, notice I said as 
far as I’m concerned, was part of the individuals 
who were in that house. The only problem that 
the government had, and the government didn’t 
call him, was the Bureau of Corrections records 
indicated that Mr. Ward was at the Bureau of 
Corrections at the time. But I know that Mr. 
Ward was out, because I had, Mr. Ward was also 
one of my clients, and I remember Mr. Ward 
being out. And from all indications, it would 
appear to me that Mr. Ward was another 
individual who may have been there along with 
Mr. Simon and Mr. Roach.  
JA 966. Ayala attempted to have Ward testify at Simon’s trial, 
but “he didn’t come to court. I couldn’t force him to come to 
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court, because, again . . . [t]he records would indicate that he 
would be in jail[.]” JA 967.  
 
 Simon was found guilty of burglary, robbery, and 
felony-murder, and sentenced to life imprisonment without 
parole. He appealed the conviction to the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands, Appellate Division.2 At that time, the Public 
Defender’s Office signed an agreement with Michael Joseph, 
Esq. to take over Simon’s appeal. Joseph filed a brief arguing 
that the District Court erred by permitting the Government to 
amend the Information to add additional charges before trial. 
The Appellate Division affirmed. Simon wished to appeal the 
decision to us. After he attempted to contact Joseph, Joseph 
sent a letter stating:  
 
I received your message . . . in which you 
demanded that I file a notice of appeal to the 3d 
Circuit from your direct appeal to the Appellate 
Division. . . . Unfortunately, such an appeal 
would be frivolous and without merit. . . . I am 
therefore advising you that you should seek other 
counsel if you insist on an appeal to the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals. Note that you must file 
such notice immediately. 
JA 921. Although Simon filed pro se a notice of appeal shortly 
thereafter, it was dismissed as untimely.  
 
                                              
2 At the time of Simon’s conviction, all appeals from the 
Superior Court (previously known as the Territorial Court) 
were heard by the District Court for the Virgin Islands, 
Appellate Division. As discussed below, appellants were 
further entitled to a second appeal as of right to us.  
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In September 1995, the United States Attorney’s Office 
filed a stipulation to vacate Roach’s sentence of first degree 
murder and reduce the conviction to second degree murder. 
Several months after Roach testified and helped secure 
Simon’s conviction, Roach withdrew his ongoing appeal to the 
Third Circuit. The United States Attorney’s Office, in 
exchange, informed the District Court of his substantial 
cooperation and requested that his conviction for first degree 
murder be vacated and reduced to second degree murder. The 
Virgin Islands Assistant Attorney General who prosecuted 
Simon’s case also submitted a letter in support of Roach’s 
resentencing. At a hearing considering this, Roach’s attorney 
indicated that:  
 
After [Roach] had filed [his] appeal with regards 
to this matter, we were approached by the 
Government and we agreed with regards to that 
matter to testify in the Territorial Court. Upon 
our testimony in the Territorial Court, we agreed 
and we stipulated to vacate the conviction for 
first degree murder.  
 
JA 868. The District Court vacated the first degree murder 
sentence, and Roach pled guilty to the new count of second 
degree murder. The District Court subsequently sentenced him 
to 20 years’ imprisonment.  
C. Habeas Proceedings.3 
 After Simon’s direct appeal, he filed this petition in the 
Superior Court. Simon argued, inter alia, that: (1) the 
                                              
3 There are several habeas petitions not before us but relevant 
to this appeal. Immediately after his trial was completed, 
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Government’s amendment to the Information two weeks 
before trial was per se reversible error; and (2) the Government 
violated its Brady obligations by failing to disclose a prior 
agreement with Roach to testify in exchange for reducing his 
conviction and sentence. The Superior Court denied the habeas 
petition in a July 18, 2002 Order without an evidentiary hearing 
(“Simon I”). Simon subsequently appealed to the Appellate 
Division.  
 
 While pending in the Appellate Division, Simon’s 
attorney, believing that there were no meritorious issues to be 
raised on appeal, filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 
386 U.S. 738 (1967). The Appellate Division, however, 
realized the Superior Court failed to issue a Certificate of 
Probable Cause (“CPC”) with its order denying the petition, as 
required by V.I. R. App. P. 14(b). Thus, the Appellate Division 
remanded back to the Superior Court where it issued the CPC. 
The CPC stated that several issues, including the Brady 
violation and the amended Information, were worthy of review 
by the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division, however, 
                                              
Simon filed pro se his first of several petitions. That petition 
was denied and Simon appealed. Arturo Watlington, Esq., was 
appointed as counsel for the appeal, which was later dismissed 
for failure to prosecute. As discussed below, Simon argues that 
Watlington was ineffective for failing to file an appellate brief. 
Simon also filed a § 2254 habeas petition with the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands, concurrent with the habeas petition 
before us. The District Court conducted an evidentiary hearing, 
where much of the testimony on this record was presented. The 
District Court dismissed that petition, however, for failure to 
exhaust remedies in the territorial courts.  
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proceeded to grant Simon’s counsel’s motion to withdraw 
pursuant to Anders, and deny the petition. It did so without 
considering the CPC. Simon then appealed to us. 
 
 We concluded that it was error for the Appellate 
Division to grant the petition to withdraw without considering 
the CPC because it established meritorious issues for appeal. 
Simon v. Gov’t of V.I., 679 F.3d 109, 115–16 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(“Simon II”). In doing so, we permitted Simon to raise 
additional issues on remand including several ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims. Id. at 116. On remand, the 
Appellate Division permitted Simon to raise, inter alia: 
 
1. Whether Ayala (trial counsel) was ineffective for: (a) 
failing to seek a continuance when new substantive 
counts were added; (b) failing to object to Roach’s 
testimony stating that Simon threatened Roach; (c) 
maintaining a conflict of interest by representing Ward; 
and (d) facilitating a breakdown in communication 
between Simon and himself.  
 
2. Whether Joseph was ineffective for: (a) refusing to file 
the notice of appeal to us on direct appeal, when Simon 
had an appeal as of right; and (b) failing to raise the 
Brady violation on direct appeal.  
3. Whether Arturo Watlington, Esq., was ineffective for 
failing to prosecute an initial (and different) habeas 
petition.  
 
4. Whether the Superior Court lacked Jurisdiction to 
preside over Simon’s trial because the crime occurred 
before that Court obtained jurisdiction.  
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Simon also raised the Brady violation and the improper 
amendment to the Information.  
 
The Appellate Division denied the petition in part, 
dismissing all issues except whether Joseph was ineffective. JA 
102–03; Simon v. Gov’t of V.I., 116 F. Supp. 3d 529, 575 (D. 
V.I. App. Div. 2015) (“Simon III”). For that claim, it remanded 
to the Superior Court to develop a factual record. After the 
Superior Court submitted findings of fact, the Appellate 
Division denied the petition, concluding that Simon had no 
right to counsel on his second appeal as of right to us. JA 9–
28; Simon v. Gov’t of V.I., 2018 WL 2994374 (D. V.I. App. 
Div. 2018) (“Simon IV”).  
 
 Simon again appealed to us. We now review the 
Appellate Division’s order denying the petition in both Simon 
III and Simon IV.  
 
 
 
II.4  
 Simon raises six issues for appeal: (1) The Brady 
violation; (2) Ayala’s ineffectiveness; (3) Joseph’s 
ineffectiveness; (4) Watlington’s ineffectiveness; (5) the 
improper amendment to the Information; and (6) the Superior 
Court’s lack of jurisdiction. We address each argument below. 
 
                                              
4 The Appellate Division had jurisdiction pursuant to 48 
U.S.C. §§ 1613a(a) and 1613a(d). We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c). 
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A. Brady Violation 
First recognized in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963), the prosecution has an obligation to disclose material 
evidence that could exculpate a defendant or help impeach an 
opposing witness. Failure to do so violates the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 
86. To establish a Brady violation, the defendant must show 
that “(1) the government withheld evidence, either willfully or 
inadvertently; (2) the evidence was favorable, either because it 
was exculpatory or of impeachment value; and (3) the withheld 
evidence was material.” United States v. Walker, 657 F.3d 160, 
185 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Because “the prosecution . . . alone can know what is 
undisclosed,” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995), a 
problem arises when the defendant bears the burden to 
establish a violation but is unlikely to uncover evidence 
without assistance. To correct this imbalance, an initial 
showing supporting the claim of a Brady violation may entitle 
a defendant to an evidentiary hearing. The trial court should 
conduct a hearing where a habeas applicant “has made out a 
prima facie case for habeas corpus relief that is not 
procedurally barred[.]” Rivera-Moreno v. Gov’t of V.I., 61 V.I. 
279, 313 (2014). If a petitioner makes a “prima facie showing,” 
then the lower court may abuse its discretion if it nonetheless 
denies an evidentiary hearing. Morris v. Beard, 633 F.3d 185, 
196 (3d Cir. 2011). But see Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 
393 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[E]ven if the factual allegations in the 
habeas petition are sufficient to make out a prima facie claim 
for habeas relief, a district court may decline to convene an 
evidentiary hearing if the factual allegations are ‘contravened 
by the existing record.’”). In considering whether to hold a 
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hearing, we have suggested that district courts “focus on 
whether a new evidentiary hearing would be meaningful, in 
that a new hearing would have the potential to advance the 
petitioner’s claim.” Morris, 633 F.3d at 196.  
 
Simon argues that the Government failed to disclose a 
prior agreement with Roach promising to reduce his conviction 
and lower his sentence in exchange for his testimony against 
Simon. Simon identifies several pieces of evidence that support 
the existence of an agreement. First, he points to testimony by 
Roach’s attorney at the June 1996 re-sentencing hearing. 
Roach’s attorney indicated that “[a]fter we had filed our appeal 
with regards to [Roach’s conviction], we were approached by 
the Government and we agreed with regards to that matter to 
testify in the Territorial Court. Upon our testimony in the 
Territorial Court, we agreed and we stipulated to vacate the 
conviction for first degree murder.” JA 868. Simon argues that 
“upon our testimony” suggests the parties reached an 
agreement prior to Roach’s testimony, conditioned upon his 
cooperation. Simon also relies upon a letter from the state 
prosecutor recommending a downward departure for Roach’s 
cooperation. See JA 866. He further argues that this is evidence 
of a relationship between the local and federal prosecutors, and 
thus the local prosecutor in Simon’s case must have known 
about a federal agreement. See United States v. Risha, 445 F.3d 
298, 299 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[C]ross-jurisdiction constructive 
knowledge can be imputed to the federal prosecution because 
of close involvement between the federal prosecution and state 
agents[.]”).5 
                                              
5 Although not raised by Simon, we note that the timing of 
Roach’s motion to continue sentencing on his federal unlawful 
flight charge could also support the existence of an agreement 
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The Superior Court denied the claim without 
conducting an evidentiary hearing. It concluded that Simon 
failed to make a showing that the Government and Roach had 
a prior agreement: “[a] request for a reduction in sentence does 
not, in and of itself, establish the existence of a quid pro quo 
between the United States or the Government of the Virgin 
Islands and James Roach.” JA 131–32. The Superior Court 
further concluded that, even if there was an agreement “there 
is no reasonable probability that . . . the outcome of the trial 
would have been different” in light of other corroborating 
testimony. JA 132. The Appellate Division agreed: The 
evidence suggests, at most, “a two-step process” where Roach 
testified and then the Government reached an agreement to 
vacate his sentence and re-sentence him under a lesser offense. 
JA 43. The Appellate Division primarily relied upon our 
decision in United States v. Freeman, 763 F.3d 322 (3d Cir. 
2014). In Freeman, we rejected the defendant’s Brady claim 
that the Government failed to disclose letters between federal 
agents and cooperating witnesses because “there is no record 
evidence that the letters even existed at the time of 
[defendant’s] trial[.]” Id. at 347. 
 
At this juncture, we believe Simon has made a prima 
facie showing that a prior agreement may have existed between 
the Government and Roach. Roach’s attorney’s testimony 
suggests, at a minimum, that the Government initiated contact 
                                              
prior to his testimony in Simon’s case. Roach moved to 
continue sentencing in October 1994, three months prior to his 
testimony. The record indicates that the United States 
Attorney’s Office later filed a § 5K1.1 motion in support of a 
sentence reduction on that count.  
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with Roach after he was found guilty. See JA 868 (“[W]e were 
approached by the government[.]”). Then, after that meeting, 
Roach dramatically changed his tune—at his own trial he 
claimed he did not know Simon, but at Simon’s trial, he 
claimed that Simon orchestrated the burglary and shot Ezekiel. 
The Appellate Division concluded that the testimony suggests 
a “two-step process,” JA 43, where Roach testified first and 
then an agreement was reached. But the testimony also 
supports the contrary conclusion: An agreement had been 
reached or assurances made before Simon’s trial, in exchange 
for his testimony against Simon. Such a factual dispute can be 
resolved at an evidentiary hearing. 
 
It is true the formal agreement between Roach and the 
federal Government may not have been memorialized until 
after trial. And favorable treatment alone is insufficient to state 
a Brady claim. See Akrawi v. Booker, 572 F.3d 252, 263 (6th 
Cir. 2009) (“[T]he mere fact that a witness desires or expects 
favorable treatment in return for his testimony is insufficient; 
there must be some assurance or promise from the prosecution 
that gives rise to a mutual understanding or tacit agreement.”); 
Shabazz v. Artuz, 336 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he fact 
that a prosecutor afforded favorable treatment to a government 
witness, standing alone, does not establish the existence of an 
underlying promise of leniency in exchange for testimony.”). 
But if the agreement was the result of prior discussions, 
promises, or assurances by the Government, then the fact that 
the agreement was put to paper later is of no moment.  
 
Nor do we agree that even if a prior agreement existed, 
it is unlikely that it would have affected the trial. “Material” 
evidence requires only “a reasonable probability” that the 
outcome of the proceedings would be different. United States 
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v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). Put simply, does the 
evidence “undermine confidence in the outcome”? Id. Here, 
Roach was the only witness to place Simon in the house and to 
claim that Simon pulled the trigger. Other testimony 
suggesting that Simon was on St. John at the time pales in 
comparison to Roach’s inculpating evidence. Although Ayala 
attempted to vigorously cross-examine Roach on his prior false 
testimony, he was rebuked by Roach’s claim that Simon had 
threatened to kill him, portraying him as desperate and 
dangerous. If Ayala was armed with the additional evidence 
that Roach reached an agreement for a lesser sentence 
contingent on his testimony, there is a reasonable probability 
the jury may have not believed Roach’s claim. See Bagley, 473 
U.S. at 676 (“[Impeachment] evidence . . . is favorable to an 
accused, so that, if disclosed and used effectively, it may make 
the difference between conviction and acquittal.” (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted)). As a result, resolution 
of this factual dispute is necessary to determine if Simon is 
entitled to relief.6  
                                              
6 Simon raises the additional argument that his appellate 
counsel, Joseph, was ineffective for failing to raise this Brady 
claim on direct review. Such a claim is not outcome 
determinative. If, after an evidentiary hearing, the Court finds 
that there was no Brady violation, then Simon was not 
prejudiced by Joseph failing to raise the issue. See, e.g., Diggs 
v. Owens, 833 F.2d 439, 446 (3d Cir. 1987) (concluding 
appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise non-
meritorious issues on appeal). And, if the Court finds that the 
Government did violate its Brady obligations, then that is 
grounds for habeas relief regardless of Joseph’s 
ineffectiveness.  
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Our conclusion does not predetermine the merits of 
Simon’s Brady claim. Rather, we conclude that the 
development of a factual record is necessary to determine 
whether the Government violated its obligation to disclose its 
prior promises to or agreements with a witness. It is possible 
the Superior Court and the Appellate Division are correct that 
the evidence supports only an after-the-fact agreement. But it 
was an abuse of discretion to make that determination absent 
an evidentiary hearing.7  
 
 
 
B. Ineffectiveness Assistance of Trial Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to effective 
trial counsel. “The benchmark for judging any claim of 
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so 
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process 
that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). A 
petitioner, first, must establish “that counsel’s performance 
was deficient.” Id. at 687. Counsel’s performance must have 
fallen “below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 
                                              
7 This conclusion does not call into question the longstanding 
principle that “[w]e think it unwise to infer the existence of 
Brady material based upon speculation alone.” United States v. 
Ramos, 27 F.3d 65, 71 (3d Cir. 1994). Here, Simon has raised 
a colorable claim beyond mere speculation by pointing to the 
testimony of Roach’s attorney who specifically discussed an 
agreement and was ambiguous regarding the time frame of the 
agreement. Such ambiguity can be resolved through an 
evidentiary hearing.  
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688; see also Gov’t of V.I. v. Vanterpool, 767 F.3d 157, 165 
(3d Cir. 2014). Second, the petitioner must establish prejudice: 
a showing that “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  
 
1. Ayala’s Ineffectiveness 
Simon argues Ayala was ineffective for several reasons. 
Simon first claims that Ayala failed to seek a continuance after 
the Superior Court granted the motion to amend the 
Information to add felony-murder and robbery. It is a high bar 
to claim ineffectiveness from failing to seek a continuance or 
lack of time to prepare. Cf. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 3–4, 
11–12 (1983) (appointing new counsel six days before trial 
when the evidence was prepared by the original attorney); 
Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 452 (1940) (affirming 
appointment of counsel three days before trial because “the 
examination and preparation of the case, in the time permitted 
by the trial judge, had been adequate for counsel to exhaust its 
every angle”). A short window of time to prepare is not a 
reason to presume ineffectiveness; counsel is ineffective only 
if the time frame affected the adversarial process. Here, the 
Government informed Ayala of the change two weeks before 
trial. The shift from premeditated murder to felony-murder and 
the addition of robbery were unlikely to meaningfully affect 
the trial strategy, as the differing elements are easily proved, 
and the evidence presented against the different charges is 
likely substantially similar. As a result, Ayala was not 
objectively unreasonable for failing to seek a continuance, nor 
has Simon explained how he was prejudiced. 
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Second, Simon argues that Ayala failed to object to 
Roach’s testimony that Simon had threatened Roach’s life and 
failed to object to the Government’s invocation of Roach’s 
testimony in closing argument. But Ayala’s cross-examination 
of Roach spent significant time on whether Roach was actually 
afraid of Simon. He asked Roach whether “Mr. Simon was in 
jail” at the time he claimed to be “afraid” of him, JA 448, 
suggesting that this fear is exaggerated and Roach was lying. 
As a result, Ayala’s decision to not object was reasonable in 
light of the alternative strategy to discredit Roach. For the same 
reasons, Ayala’s decision to respond to the Government’s 
closing statement, rather than object, was not an objectively 
unreasonable decision. 
 
Third, Simon claims there was a constructive denial of 
counsel because the Court failed to substitute counsel despite 
an “irreparable breakdown of the attorney-client relationship.” 
Pet. Br. at 37. He cites to Ayala’s heavy caseload at the time 
and his repeated attempts to withdraw as counsel as evidence 
of the deteriorating relationship.8 There is no evidence, 
                                              
8 Ayala admitted that, in light of the case load, his work was 
not up to his personal standards: “I would have to characterize 
[my performance] as ineffective, because there is no way. 
Capital cases require a lot of leg work. Public Defender’s 
office[s] are not equipped with the personnel, and I mean the 
supporting personnel. For example, I had to do the 
investigations myself. I didn’t have any competent investigator 
at that time[.]” JA 948. Although the statements of an attorney 
can bear on the conclusion of ineffectiveness, Strickland 
describes the standard as objective. Thus, even though Ayala 
may believe he was unable to be effective, we still evaluate 
whether his conduct was objectively reasonable. 
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however, that the relationship or caseload affected the 
reliability of the adversarial process. See United States v. 
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984) (“Absent some effect of 
challenged conduct on the reliability of the trial process, the 
Sixth Amendment guarantee is generally not implicated.”). 
The evidence instead points to Ayala being adequately 
prepared for the demands of Simon’s trial. 
 
2. Conflict of Interest 
 We nonetheless believe the Appellate Division erred by 
rejecting Simon’s claim that Ayala operated under a conflict of 
interest without first remanding to develop the factual record. 
See, e.g., Rivera-Moreno, 61 V.I. at 311–12 (2014) 
(concluding once petitioner makes a prima facie case for relief, 
a writ ought to be issued, and a hearing conducted).  
 
A petitioner claiming a conflict of interest must “prove 
(1) multiple representation that (2) created an actual conflict of 
interest that (3) adversely affected the lawyer’s performance.” 
Sullivan v. Cuyler, 723 F.2d 1077, 1084 (3d Cir. 1983). The 
“critical inquiry is whether counsel actively represented 
conflicting interests.” Gov’t of V.I. v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 135 
(3d Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). There must 
be a point where “the defendants’ interests diverge with respect 
to a material factual or legal issue or to a course of action.” 
Sullivan, 723 F.2d at 1086.9 This could result from refusing to 
                                              
9 A petitioner need not establish an “actual” conflict of interest 
if the trial counsel moved to withdraw based on a conflict of 
interest. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980). Simon 
urges “[we] should construe Ayala’s motions [to withdraw] as 
objections [based on an existing conflict of interest] for 
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cross-examine a witness, failing to respond to inadmissible 
evidence, or failing to “diminish the jury’s perception of a [co-
conspirator’s] guilt.” Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349 
(1980). A petitioner can also show that the attorney failed to 
pursue an alternative strategy that “(a) could benefit the instant 
defendant and (b) would violate the attorney’s duties to the 
other client.” United States v. Morelli, 169 F.3d 798, 811 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (emphasis omitted). Such an alternative strategy 
need not “have been successful if it had been used” but must 
have “possessed sufficient substance to be a viable 
alternative.” United States v. Gambino, 864 F.2d 1064, 1070 
(3d Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Fahey, 769 F.2d 829, 
836 (1st Cir. 1985)). 
 
Simon argues that Ayala had an actual conflict of 
interest at the time of his trial because he represented the 
potential third intruder, Daryl Ward. Ayala testified in an 
unrelated proceeding that Ward was “also one of [his] clients” 
and that “from all indications, it would appear” that Ward was 
with Simon and Roach on the night in question. JA 966. At 
trial, Roach testified that Ward “fit the description” of the third 
man, but that it wasn’t him “[be]cause he was in jail, and when 
I really think, it wasn’t him.” JA 465–66. Roach further 
testified, however, that the three men ran from the house and 
that the third man parted ways “[w]here Daryl Ward lives.” JA 
469–70. Taken together, Simon argues that “Ayala knew that 
another individual was either the perpetrator of the crime that 
Simon was charged of, or was a potential witness to the crime.” 
Pet. Br. at 36.  
                                              
purposes of appellate review.” Pet. Br. at 36. The record does 
not support that reading, and thus, Simon must establish an 
“actual” conflict.  
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The Appellate Division disagreed. It characterized 
Ayala’s statement as “speculation” that Ward was the third 
man and emphasized the portion of Roach’s testimony where 
he claimed that Ward was not the third man. JA 73. It 
concluded that Simon failed to establish a conflict of interest. 
We disagree. Ayala’s statement, made under oath, cannot be 
properly characterized as mere speculation. Ayala stated that, 
based on his relationship with Ward, he believed Ward was the 
third man. Ayala’s testimony is corroborated in part by 
Roach’s testimony, which also implicated Ward. He claimed 
that Ward “fit the description” of the third man and that the 
third man fled towards Ward’s home. JA 465. In closing 
argument, the Government noted that Roach indicated the third 
man was named Crucian; Roach also testified that he has heard 
people refer to Ward as “Crucian.” JA 464. Finally, there was 
evidence that Ward was in jail at the time of the crime. But, 
Ayala definitively testified that Ward was out of jail at that 
time, even though “the [jail] records would have been against 
[him].” JA 967.  
 
The evidence can be interpreted to reach two different 
results: one putting Ward at the scene of the crime, and one 
placing him in jail at the time. Based on the evidence as it exists 
at this time, neither interpretation can be deemed 
“speculation.” Because Simon set out a prima facie claim of a 
conflict of interest, he was entitled to develop the factual record 
on this issue. We thus remand to the Appellate Division with 
instructions to remand to the Superior Court to develop the 
factual record on this claim.  
 
C. Joseph’s Ineffectiveness: Second Appeal as of Right 
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At the time of Simon’s direct review, a defendant had 
two appeals as of right from the Superior Court: first, to the 
Appellate Division of the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
and, then, to us. See 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(a) (conferring 
Appellate jurisdiction to the District Court over the courts of 
the Virgin Islands); 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c) (conferring 
jurisdiction to the Third Circuit over the District Court).10 
Simon was represented by Joseph on his appeal to the 
Appellate Division. The Appellate Division affirmed his 
conviction. Then, despite Simon’s desire to file an appeal to 
the Third Circuit, Joseph declined to do so. Simon then filed 
pro se a notice of appeal, which was dismissed as untimely. 
Simon argues that Joseph was ineffective for failing to file a 
notice of appeal to the Third Circuit—his second appeal as of 
right.  
 
But a petitioner does not have a right to counsel at every 
stage of every proceeding. And if a petitioner does not have a 
right to counsel, then it is not a constitutional violation to 
receive ineffective assistance. See Wainwright v. Torna, 455 
U.S. 586, 587–88 (1982) (“Since respondent had no 
constitutional right to counsel, he could not be deprived of the 
effective assistance of counsel by his retained counsel’s failure 
                                              
10 This system of two-tier appellate review as of right is rare. 
See Gov’t of V.I. v. Hodge, 359 F.3d 312, 323 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(noting its peculiarity but recognizing Congress intended the 
system of review). Now, with the establishment of the Supreme 
Court of the Virgin Islands, criminal convictions and sentences 
from the Superior Court are appealed as of right to the V.I. 
Supreme Court, not here. Thus, this system of two-tier review 
(although governing at the time of Simon’s appeal) is no longer 
in effect in the Virgin Islands. 
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to file the application timely.”).11 So Simon’s claim of 
ineffectiveness depends on whether he had a right to counsel 
on his appeal to the Third Circuit. If he did, failure to file the 
petition was per se ineffective without need for a showing of 
prejudice. See Solis v. United States, 252 F.3d 289, 293–94 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (concluding that attorney’s failure to file a notice of 
appeal, despite clear instructions from defendant to do so, was 
presumptively prejudicial). To answer this question, we must 
determine whether there is a right to counsel on a second 
appeal as of right. We conclude that there is not. 
 Denial of appellate counsel at important stages of 
appellate review may violate a defendant’s rights to due 
process and equal protection under the law. See Douglas v. 
People of State of Cal., 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963); see also 48 
U.S.C. § 1561 (Virgin Islands Revised Organic Code “Bill of 
Rights”).  
 
 The Supreme Court has consistently addressed two 
concerns when considering the need for appellate counsel. 
First, has the appellant already received some form of appellate 
review? If so, a defendant would have “at the very least, a 
                                              
11 Simon cites Richardson v. Superintendent Coal Township 
SCI, 905 F.3d 750 (3d Cir. 2018) for the assertion that Simon 
had a right to counsel on the notice of appeal to the Third 
Circuit. There, we said “the line dividing trial from appeal falls 
naturally at the notice of appeal.” Id. at 756. Richardson did 
not, however, address counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to 
file the notice of appeal, but rather ineffectiveness in the post-
sentencing proceedings. Id. The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Wainwright v. Torna, which addressed an attorney’s failure to 
file a timely application for certiorari, is consistent with 
Richardson and controls here.  
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transcript or other record of trial proceedings, a brief on his 
behalf in the Court of Appeals setting forth his claims of error, 
and in many cases an opinion by the Court of Appeals 
disposing of his case.” Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 615 
(1974). And second, does the court have discretion to review? 
That is to say, can the reviewing court deny review “even 
though it believes that the decision of the Court of Appeals was 
incorrect[?]” Id. Discretionary appeals, contrary to appeals as 
of right, are not wholly concerned with “whether there has been 
a correct adjudication of guilt in every individual case[.]” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). We are, thus, less 
concerned if a defendant does not receive the assistance of 
counsel on discretionary review.  
 
 Applying these principles, the Court has twice extended 
the right to counsel to the first tier of appellate review. In 
Douglas, it concluded that a state violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment if it fails to provide an indigent defendant counsel 
on his first appeal as of right: “[W]here the merits of the one 
and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without 
benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been 
drawn between rich and poor.” Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357. The 
Court feared that having an indigent defendant “run this 
gantlet” without counsel results in a “meaningless ritual.” Id. 
at 357–58. Similarly, in Halbert v. Michigan, the Court 
extended the right of counsel to first-tier appellate review, even 
though review was discretionary. 545 U.S. 605, 616–17 
(2005). The Court concluded that because the reviewing court 
“looks to the merits of the claims” and the indigent defendant 
is “generally ill-equipped” to argue the merits unassisted, 
failure to provide counsel on such denial draws an 
unconstitutional line. Id. at 617.  
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The Court, however, has not recognized a right to 
counsel beyond the first-tier of appellate review. In Ross, the 
Court concluded that the right to counsel does not extend to 
subsequent discretionary appeals, since “both the opportunity 
to have counsel prepare an initial brief . . . and the nature of 
discretionary review . . . make this relative handicap far less 
than the handicap borne by the indigent defendant denied 
counsel on his initial appeal as of right in Douglas.” Ross, 417 
U.S. at 616. And in Pennsylvania v. Finley, the Court extended 
Ross to uphold Pennsylvania’s decision to deny counsel on 
postconviction review because “[p]ostconviction relief is even 
further removed from the criminal trial than is discretionary 
direct review.” 481 U.S. 551, 556–57 (1987).12  
The second appeal as of right situates itself between the 
two rationales outlined by the Supreme Court. Unlike a first 
appeal, the defendant seeking a subsequent appeal has “at the 
very least, a transcript or other record of trial proceedings, a 
                                              
12 In Finley, the Court stated “[o]ur cases establish that the right 
to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no 
further.” Finley, 481 U.S. at 555. Other courts have relied upon 
this statement alone to reject a right to counsel on second 
appeals as of right. See State v. Buell, 639 N.E.2d 110, 110 
(Ohio 1994) (relying on “and no further” to extend the right to 
counsel only to first appeals as of right); State v. Hughan, 703 
N.W.2d 263, 265–66 (Neb. Ct. App. 2005) (same). But the 
Court has never squarely reached second appeals as of right. 
Because we should only apply dicta when “the case at bar is [] 
the situation the Court’s dictum anticipated,” Off. Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 
F.3d 548, 561 (3d Cir. 2003), we decline to apply it here 
without further analysis. 
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brief on his behalf in the Court of Appeals setting forth his 
claims of error, and in many cases an opinion by the Court of 
Appeals disposing of his case.” Ross, 417 U.S. at 615. But, 
unlike discretionary review, a second appeal as of right must 
be reviewed, and is thus intended to ensure the “correct 
adjudication of guilt.” Id.  
 
Here, given the specific nature of the two layers of 
review, we conclude that deprivation of counsel on Simon’s 
second appeal as of right to the Third Circuit does not deny 
equal protection or due process. After review by the Appellate 
Division, Simon had at his disposal the full record of the trial 
court, a merits brief arguing the Superior Court erred by 
amending the Information two weeks before trial, and an 
opinion addressing the merits of that claim. Any concern that 
he may be “ill-equipped” is significantly lessened by the 
thorough review on his first appeal as of right. And although 
review by the Court of Appeals under the Virgin Islands’ 
scheme is also as of right, and therefore concerned with the 
adjudication of guilt, our review is not meaningfully different 
from the Appellate Division’s review. See BA Props. Inc. v. 
Gov’t of V.I., 299 F.3d 207, 211–12 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that 
the Appellate Division is “essentially a federal creature” where 
panels are comprised of “a majority of federal judges”). The 
same concerns present in Douglas and Halbert do not apply 
with equal force when the defendant lacks counsel on a second 
appeal as of right. Because Simon was not entitled to counsel 
on his second appeal as of right, any ineffectiveness does not 
amount to a constitutional violation.13 
                                              
13 Simon filed a legal malpractice claim based in part on 
Joseph’s failure to file a notice of appeal to the Third Circuit. 
See Simon v. Joseph, 59 V.I. 611, 613 (2013). Whether Simon 
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D. Watlington’s Ineffectiveness 
Simon also argues that Attorney Arturo Watlington was 
ineffective when he failed to file a brief in a separate habeas 
petition that was dismissed for failure to prosecute. We agree 
with the Appellate Division that we are unable to review this 
claim, as it involves a habeas petition distinct from the petition 
here.14  
E. The Amendment to the Information 
The Government initially filed an Information charging 
Simon with premeditated murder and third degree burglary. 
Two weeks before trial, the Government notified Simon that it 
intended to amend the Information. One week before trial, it 
moved to amend the Information changing premeditated 
murder to felony-murder with a predicate felony of robbery. 
The amendment also added robbery and conspiracy to commit 
robbery. Ayala objected, as the amendment added new charges 
only a week before trial. The Court nonetheless granted the 
motion to amend the Information. Two days before trial, the 
Court again permitted an amendment to cure a defect, over 
                                              
had a constitutional right to counsel is a separate inquiry from 
whether Joseph committed malpractice by failing to file the 
notice.  
14 Even so, because there is generally no right to counsel on 
habeas review, and never a right to counsel on appellate habeas 
review, there can be no denial of effective assistance for any 
alleged failure to prosecute. See Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 
16 (2012); Torna, 455 U.S. at 587–88 (concluding there can be 
no denial of effective assistance if there is no right to counsel). 
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Ayala’s objection, removing the conspiracy count and altering 
some language to reflect the elements of felony-murder.  
 
Simon argues that these eleventh hour amendments 
constituted constructive amendments, violating his Sixth 
Amendment right to be informed of charges against him. 
Simon’s constitutional claim ends with the definition of a 
constructive amendment: “An indictment is constructively 
amended when, in the absence of a formal amendment, the 
evidence and jury instructions at trial modify essential terms of 
the charged offense[.]” United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 
512, 532 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(emphasis added). The amendment here was granted after a 
formal motion to amend. Thus, this is not a constructive 
amendment. Rather, the issue is whether the Superior Court 
abused its discretion in permitting the amendment of the 
Information to add a new charge of robbery, one week before 
trial in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(e).  
 
Rule 7(e) provides “[u]nless an additional or different 
offense is charged or a substantial right of the defendant is 
prejudiced, the court may permit an information to be amended 
at any time before the verdict or finding.” Whether the 
amendment adds an “additional or different offense” is “not 
coextensive with the question of whether a crime is a lesser 
included offense of another.” Gov’t of V.I. v. Bedford, 671 F.2d 
758, 765 (3d Cir. 1982). To determine if the offense is 
additional or different, we look to whether the original 
Information provides adequate notice of the added charge. Id. 
The Superior Court on habeas review concluded that the 
substitution of the felony murder charge for premeditated 
murder did not amount to the charge of a different offense, but 
that the trial court technically erred when it permitted the 
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Government to add the robbery charge because it is an 
“additional or different offense” than those offenses originally 
charged. We agree: A plain reading of Rule 7(e) confirms that 
it was an error to amend the original Information to include the 
robbery count. Robbery is an additional and different offense 
from burglary,15 and the Information was not sufficiently 
detailed to alert Simon of the new offense. 
 
Even though it was error to permit the amendment, the 
error was harmless.16 See United States v. Steiner, 847 F.3d 
103, 113 (3d Cir. 2017) (“We can call a non-constitutional 
error harmless, and uphold the conviction, if there is a high 
probability that the error did not contribute to the judgment, 
requiring us to have a sure conviction that the error did not 
prejudice the defendant.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Here, Simon received adequate notice—two weeks before the 
                                              
15 The offenses are different because each requires the 
Government to establish an element the other does not: 
Robbery requires the unlawful taking of personal property in 
the possession of another, 14 V.I.C. § 1861, and burglary 
requires breaking and entering into a building. 14 V.I.C. § 
444(1). See Gov’t of V.I. v. Brathwaite, 782 F.2d 399, 406–07 
(3d Cir. 1986) (describing the Blockburger test).  
16 The Superior Court elected to impose the Chapman standard 
of harmless error review, concluding that the error was 
“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” JA 122–24; Chapman 
v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). In doing so, it conflated 
a Rule 7(e) violation with a Sixth Amendment violation. As 
noted here, we see those as two separate inquiries, and thus 
reject the Sixth Amendment claim, because there was no 
constructive amendment or variance, and apply the lower 
harmless error standard to the Rule 7(e) violation.  
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trial—of the robbery charge and the facts significantly 
overlapped with the already charged offense of burglary. There 
is a high probability the change from burglary to robbery did 
not affect the trial strategy. Even so, given the record, two 
weeks was enough time to address any effect it may have had. 
Thus, to the extent that there was error, it was harmless.  
 
F. The Superior Court’s Jurisdiction 
Prior to January 1994, the Superior Court of the Virgin 
Islands did not have jurisdiction to hear first degree murder 
cases. That jurisdiction was conferred effective on January 1, 
1994. The crime here occurred in September 1993 and the 
Government filed charges against Simon in May 1994. On 
appeal, Simon argues the Superior Court did not have 
jurisdiction over his felony-murder case because the crime 
occurred before the Superior Court had jurisdiction.17 He 
claims the date the crime is committed is the date that 
determines whether a court has jurisdiction.  
 
We disagree. The date that a court must have 
jurisdiction is the date that charges are filed against the 
defendant. See Gov’t of V.I. v. Colbourne, 31 V.I. 22, 26 (Terr. 
Ct. 1994) (“[A]s long as the . . . action was filed after 
jurisdiction passed to the Territorial Court, the Territorial 
                                              
17 Simon also argues that one must look to the intent of the 
legislature when determining whether a statute should be 
applied retroactively, citing to Brewer v. A.D. Transp. Express, 
Inc., 782 N.W. 2d 475 (Mich. 2010). Not only is Brewer not 
binding on this court, it is inapplicable, as it addresses the 
expansion of substantive rights in a workers’ compensation 
context, rather than the transfer of jurisdiction between courts.  
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Court had jurisdiction over the matter.”) (citing Skelton v. 
Gov’t, T.C. Crim. No. F155/1992 (V.I. Terr. Ct. 1992), aff’d, 
290 F. Supp. 2d 603 (D. V.I. App. Div. 1994)); see also Old 
Colony Trust v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 279 U.S. 716, 
727–28  (1929) (having jurisdiction over a tax deficiency that 
occurred in 1919 and 1920, where the court gained jurisdiction 
in 1926 and the petition for review was perfected in 1927). 
Here, the Government filed the charges against Simon in the 
Superior Court several months after the Superior Court gained 
jurisdiction. Thus, the Superior Court had jurisdiction.  
 
III. 
 For the above reasons, we will affirm in part, reverse in 
part, and vacate the Appellate Division’s order. We will 
remand to the Appellate Division of the District Court for the 
Virgin Islands with instructions to remand to the Superior 
Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding the Brady 
violation and the conflict of interest claim.  
